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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has used section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (FTC Act) to regulate com-
panies’ data security practices since 2002.1 Section 5 of the FTC Act
empowers the FTC to regulate “unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices.”2 When the FTC first began using this power in the realm of
data security, it focused on its deceptiveness power rather than its
unfairness power.3 The deceptiveness power permits the FTC to
investigate cases involving “a representation, omission or practice
that is likely to mislead the consumer.”4 In the realm of data
security, the FTC uses this power to file complaints against compan-
ies who have “deceived” consumers by violating their own privacy
policies.5 The problem is that when companies have exercised poor
data security practices but have not violated their internal privacy
policies—either because their policies are not comprehensive enough
or because they do not have a privacy policy at all—those practices
are not considered “deceptive” and thus are beyond the FTC’s reach
under its deceptiveness power.6 As a result, the FTC has broadened
1. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012); FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMISSION STATEMENT MARK-
ING THE FTC’S 50TH DATA SECURITY SETTLEMENT 1 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/cases/140131gmrstatement.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HDW-EKD4]; Michael D. Scott,
The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litigation: Has the Commission
Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 129 (2008).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
3. See Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to the Honorable
John D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives
(Oct. 14, 1983) [hereinafter FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION], appended to Clifford
Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 app. at 174 (1984); see also Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell Bart-
nick, Essay, Psychics, Russian Roulette, and Data Security: The FTC’s Hidden Data-Security
Requirements, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 674-75 (2013).
4. See FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION, supra note 3, at app. at 174-75.
5. See Scott, supra note 1, at 129; Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 3, at 674; cf. FTC
POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION, supra note 3, at app. at 175 (“Practices that have been
found misleading or deceptive in specific cases include false oral or written representations,
... sales of hazardous or systematically defective products or services without adequate dis-
closures, ... failure to perform promised services, and failure to meet warranty obligations.”).
6. Cf. J. Howard Beales III, The Federal Trade Commission’s Use of Unfairness
Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and Resurrection, 22 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 192, 192 (2003)
(“Now, however, the FTC is using unfairness to attack practices that cause substantial injury
but that could not be reached under deception theory, at least not without twisting the
meaning of deception.”).
2017] A CASE OF OVERCORRECTION 2107
its own reach by filing data security complaints under its unfairness
power.7
The FTC uses a three-prong test, codified in 1994,8 for finding
unfair acts or practices in data security cases.9 Under that test, the
injury (1) “must be substantial”; (2) “must not be outweighed by any
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that the prac-
tice produces”; and (3) “must be an injury that consumers them-
selves could not reasonably have avoided.”10 Despite the FTC having
initiated more than fifty data security proceedings since 2002,11 this
unfairness test remains vague and largely unsettled.12
The FTC’s current application of the unfairness test is harmful to
competition because it imposes a substantial burden on small
businesses and hinders them from successfully competing in the
market.13 Due to the vague nature of the unfairness test, small busi-
nesses cannot anticipate what constitutes a breach and therefore
cannot ensure that their practices pass FTC muster.14 Consequently,
small businesses either avoid taking risks and shy away from
innovation, or they face the FTC’s hefty settlement demands, which
are not adequately tailored to the size and resources of each busi-
ness.15 Either way, the FTC’s current practices harm competition by
making small businesses unwilling or unable to compete in any
meaningful way.16
Although the FTC claims it tailors its data security regulation to
individual companies’ particular circumstances,17 in practice its
7. See infra Part II.C.
8. Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, § 9, 108
Stat. 1691, 1695 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)).
9. See Beales, supra note 6, at 195.
10. Id. at 194 (quoting FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS, infra note 44, at app. at
1070, 1073).
11. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2.
12. See Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Section 5 Revisited: Time for the
FTC to Define the Scope of Its Unfair Methods of Competition Authority, Remarks at the
Symposium on Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 5-6 (Feb. 26, 2015), https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/626811/150226bh_section_5_sympo
sium.pdf [https://perma.cc/29UD-NDWW].
13. See infra Part III.A.2. 
14. See infra Part III.A.1.
15. See infra Part III.A.3.
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 3, at 693-94.
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settlement agreements with various companies are all nearly
identical.18 Each settlement involves what is known as a “consent
order” or “consent decree,” in which a company agrees to implement
typically twenty years of costly and time-consuming corrective data
security measures.19 These measures are problematic because they
are far too costly for small businesses that do not have the man-
power or money to implement them.20
Even though businesses technically “agree” to these consent
decrees through settlement, the FTC essentially forces them into
these agreements because these businesses have little ability or
incentive to litigate.21 This problem is especially true for small
businesses for two principal reasons. First, litigation is too expen-
sive and time-consuming.22 For example, the cost of litigation in
FTC v. LabMD, Inc., effectively shut down a business.23 LabMD,
Inc., is an Atlanta-based cancer-detecting laboratory24 that used to
test specimen samples taken from patients by their health care
providers.25 The FTC filed a complaint against LabMD for a poten-
tial breach of patient information when a third party found the
personal information of some of LabMD’s patients on Limewire, a
peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing network.26 Instead of signing a con-
sent decree like almost every other company, LabMD challenged the
FTC through litigation.27 Ultimately, the FTC won the battle.28
LabMD no longer accepts new patients and merely exists to pre-
serve test samples and to make available past test results.29
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See infra Part II.A. 
20. See infra Part III.A.1. 
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See Dan Epstein, Opinion, Hounded Out of Business by Regulators, WALL STREET J.
(Nov. 19, 2015, 7:11 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hounded-out-of-business-by-regulators-
1447978301 [https://perma.cc/L4KF-PXKY].
24. Id.
25. See Complaint [Provisionally Redacted Public Version], LabMD, Inc., F.T.C. Docket
No. 9357, at 1 (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/08/
130829labmdpart3.pdf [https://perma.cc/BF8Z-2G68].
26. See id. at 4.
27. See infra Part II.B.
28. See Epstein, supra note 23.
29. See Opinion of the Commission, LabMD, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. 9357, at 4 (July 28,
2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160729labmd-opinion.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X8HS-CG5V] (discussing the current business state of LabMD).
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Additionally, LabMD must now adhere to one of the FTC’s twenty-
year data security plans that is included in every consent decree.30
The second reason small businesses have little ability or incentive
to litigate is that the FTC benefits from tremendous institutional
bias.31 Even though the administrative law judges (ALJs) are sep-
arate from the investigative arm of the FTC, that bias still appar-
ently exists because the FTC has affirmed judgment in every case
in which the ALJ found in favor of the FTC staff, but has reversed
judgement in every case in which the ALJ found against the FTC
staff.32
If the FTC continues to use its unfairness power in this way, then
it will harm competition by running smaller businesses out of the
market, leaving the big businesses that can afford to settle with the
FTC as market monopolies.33 Ultimately, consumers will be left
without adequate, affordable choices for all types of products and
services.34
To remedy this problem, the FTC should apply a framework
similar to the antitrust rule of reason to the balancing prong of its
unfairness test—that is, the harm to consumers must not be
“outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competi-
tion.”35 The antitrust rule of reason consists of a burden-shifting
analysis focused on competitive effects of particular acts or prac-
tices.36 For purposes of the unfairness test, the FTC should focus on
whether its own methods of regulating data security acts or prac-
tices are actually anticompetitive by forcing companies out of the
market.37 By considering these effects, the FTC will be forced to
more adequately tailor its regulation of data security to the size and
30. Final Order, LabMD, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. 9357 (July 28, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/cases/160729labmdorder.pdf [https://perma.cc/ERA3-5TXT]; see also
infra Part II.A (discussing the identical nature of the FTC’s consent decrees).
31. See Wright, supra note 12, at 6-7 (discussing and presenting evidence of the institu-
tional bias).
32. See id. at 6 n.2 (data reported from Aug. 2013); see also Final Order, LabMD, Inc.,
supra note 30, at 1 (reversing Chief A.L.J. D. Michael Chappell’s Initial Order that held there
was no violation on the part of LabMD).
33. See infra Part III.A.
34. See infra Part III.A. 
35. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012).
36. See infra Part III.B.
37. See infra Part III.B.
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resources of each business. This modification will give the FTC’s
largely ad hoc approach a great deal more consistency and will
benefit competition—and therefore consumers—in the long term.
Part I of this Note discusses the FTC’s power to regulate data
security. It surveys the history of the FTC’s section 5 authority
generally and how the FTC began to use this authority in data
security cases. Part II details the data security cases the FTC has
pursued under section 5. It discusses the settlements, or “consent
decrees,” the FTC has entered into with various companies, the two
major cases that challenged the FTC’s data security complaints and
underwent extensive litigation, and the unfairness test as it stands
today. Part III explores the problems with the current analysis
under the unfairness test and the corresponding potential harms to
smaller businesses. Part III then proposes a new framework by
discussing the antitrust rule of reason and follows with an explana-
tion as to why this framework is better suited to deal with data
security issues than the current framework.
I. HISTORY OF THE FTC’S UNFAIRNESS AUTHORITY IN DATA
SECURITY CASES
A. Pre-1980
In the FTC Act, Congress established the FTC and charged it
with preventing anticompetitive practices.38 Congress later gave the
FTC its broad unfairness authority when it amended section 5 of the
FTC Act in 1938.39 Also known as the Wheeler-Lea Act, this amend-
ment made “[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce” unlawful.40 Under
these provisions, the FTC held the authority to protect consumers
directly by enforcing these provisions against businesses.41
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1); see also About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://
www.ftc.gov/about-ftc [https://perma.cc/YSH5-G2T9].
39. See Wheeler-Lea Act, ch. 49, sec. 3, § 5(a), 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) (codified as amend-
ed at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012)).
40. Id. (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”).
41. Beales, supra note 6, at 192.
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The FTC initially failed to distinguish between unfair acts or
practices and deceptive acts or practices, and treated section 5 of the
FTC Act as if the provision said “and,” instead of “or.”42 In 1964 the
FTC then distinguished between the two when it released the
Cigarette Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose.43 In that statement,
the FTC summed up the unfairness test in three prongs: in cases in-
volving unfair acts or practices, the FTC would consider “(1) wheth-
er the practice ... offends public policy as it has been established by
statutes, the common law, or otherwise ... ; (2) whether it is im-
moral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it
causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other
businessmen).”44
In 1972 the Supreme Court in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.
took the position that section 5 “empower[s] the Commission to
define and proscribe an unfair competitive practice, even though the
practice does not infringe either the letter or the spirit of the
antitrust laws.”45 Section 5 also “empower[s] the Commission to
proscribe practices as unfair or deceptive in their effect upon
consumers regardless of their nature or quality as competitive
practices or their effect on competition.”46
Although the Supreme Court approved of the FTC’s broad power,
it still failed to provide the FTC with any guidance for applying
42. See id.
43. Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health
Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8354 (July 2, 1964) (“[T]he prohibitions of section 5
of the Trade Commission Act embrace acts, practices, or methods of competition that are
neither deceptive or misleading, on the one hand, nor monopolistic or anticompetitive, on the
other.”); see also Beales, supra note 6, at 192-93 (“[I]n the Cigarette Rule SBP, the commission
set forth a test for determining whether an act or practice is ‘unfair.’”).
44. Letter from Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n et al., to the Honorable
Wendell H. Ford & the Honorable John C. Danforth, Consumer Subcomm., Comm. on Com-
merce, Sci. & Transp., U.S. Senate, Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of the
Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction (Dec. 17, 1980) [hereinafter FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON
UNFAIRNESS] (quoting Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation
to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. at 8355), appended to Int’l Harvester Co., 104
F.T.C. 949 app. at 1070, 1072 n.8 (1984).
45. 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972).
46. Id. This was despite the Supreme Court’s reversal of the FTC’s prior ruling. See
Beales, supra note 6, at 193 & n.5 (“Proceedings before the FTC were based on the theory that
Sperry & Hutchinson was engaged in an unfair method of competition. On appeal, the
Commission argued that Sperry & Hutchinson was engaged in unfair practices. The Court
reversed and remanded because the case was not tried under an unfair practices theory.”).
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these three prongs.47 For the next eight years, the FTC inconsis-
tently applied its unfairness power in a variety of cases.48 To solve
this problem and to answer questions from Congress and many
others, the FTC passed the FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness in
1980.49 In this statement, the FTC declared that “[u]njustified
consumer injury is the primary focus of the FTC Act, and the most
important of the three [Sperry & Hutchinson] criteria.”50 In fact, the
FTC stated that it could find that an act or practice was unfair
based on unjustified consumer injury alone.51 Yet that “[did] not
mean that every consumer injury [was] legally ‘unfair.’”52 Conse-
quently, the FTC set forth a different unfairness test than the one
it articulated in 1964: the injury (1) “must be substantial”; (2) “must
not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or
competition that the practice produces”; and (3) “must be an injury
that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided.”53
The FTC codified this approach in 1994, “reestablish[ing] a cost-
benefit analysis (injury to consumers not outweighed by countervail-
ing benefits) as the test for unfairness,” rather than the public-
policy focus of the 1964 Cigarette Rule.54 The codification is now
section 5(n) of the FTC Act, which reads as follows:
The Commission shall have no authority under this section or
section 18 to declare unlawful an act or practice on the grounds
that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice
causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers
which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and
not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition. In determining whether an act or practice is unfair,
the Commission may consider established public policies as
47. See Beales, supra note 6, at 193.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 193-94.
50. FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS, supra note 44, at app. at 1073.
51. Id. (enabling the FTC to rely on consumer injury as an “independent criterion”). The
FTC justified this position on the intent of the statute: to make “the consumer who may be
injured by an unfair trade practice of equal concern before the law with the merchant injured
by the unfair methods of a dishonest competitor.” Id. (quoting 83 CONG. REC. 3255 (1938)
(remarks of Sen. Wheeler)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Beales, supra note 6, at 192-94.
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evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Such public
policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such
determination.55
After codification of the unfairness test, the FTC largely avoided
using it for the remainder of the 1990s and began using it again on-
ly to reach cases of “substantial injury ... that could not be reached
under deception theory.”56 One example of this is in the realm of
data security cases.
B. Post-1980
Internet commerce grew rapidly in the mid-1990s, and “the
Commission has been at the forefront of the public debate on online
privacy” since 1995.57 Initially, the FTC argued against Congress
passing legislation to regulate online privacy.58 Instead, the FTC
pushed for industry self-regulation as the way to control online pri-
vacy issues.59
The FTC’s idea of self-regulation involved companies voluntarily
providing the FTC with copies of their “online information practice
guidelines and principles.”60 Although some companies stepped up
and began utilizing the online privacy practices the FTC had been
hoping for, this approach ultimately proved ineffective.61 Self-regu-
55. Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, § 9, 108
Stat. 1691, 1695 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012)).
56. Beales, supra note 6, at 192.
57. See DIV. OF FIN. PRACTICES, FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION
PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE, A REPORT TO CONGRESS 1-3 (2000) [hereinafter
FTC 2000 REPORT TO CONGRESS], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
privacy-online-fair-information-practices-electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-
report/privacy2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/89P4-29XU].
58. See id. at 34-35.
59. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS 41 (1998) [hereinafter FTC 1998 REPORT TO CONGRESS], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3K7Q-2WPU]; see also FTC 2000 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 57, at 34-35 (“In its 1999
Report, a majority of the Commission again determined that legislation was not then appro-
priate, but noted the ‘substantial challenges’ that industry continued to face in implementing
widespread self-regulation.”).
60. FTC 1998 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 59, at 15.
61. See FTC 2000 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 57, at 35 (“Notwithstanding several
years of industry and governmental effort, only 8% of heavily-trafficked Web sites display a
seal from one of the self-regulatory seal programs.”).
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lation was unsuccessful because the FTC could not force companies
to comply with its online privacy recommendations, including the
recommendation that they should even have a policy in the first
place.62 As a result, after two years of trying to make self-regulation
take hold in the business community, the FTC eventually pushed for
Congress to pass legislation as a means of regulation.63
Shortly thereafter, the FTC reverted back to its old stance in
support of a more aggressive approach on legislative regulation.64 In
a 2001 speech, FTC Chairman Timothy Muris announced the FTC’s
position on online privacy to protect consumers through “aggressive
enforcement of the basic laws of consumer protection.”65
One of the enforcement mechanisms Muris was talking about is
the FTC’s use of its deceptiveness power.66 According to the FTC, a
practice is deceptive when it involves “a representation, omission or
practice that is likely to mislead the consumer.”67 The FTC uses its
deceptiveness power under section 5 to investigate companies that
have published their own privacy policies but have failed to follow
them.68 For example, in the FTC’s case against Snapchat, Inc., a
company known for its video and picture messaging application,69
the FTC argued that Snapchat misrepresented how much data was
collected from consumers and how it protected that data.70 But this
approach did not apply to all cases. If a corporation had not contra-
62. See id. at 34 (“As a general matter, however, the Commission lacks authority to re-
quire firms to adopt information practice policies or to abide by the fair information practice
principles on their Web sites.”).
63. See id. at 36.
64. See Scott, supra note 1, at 131; cf. FTC 2000 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 57, at
36-37 (“[T]he Commission recommends that any legislation be phrased in general terms and
be technologically neutral. Thus, the definitions of fair information practices set forth in the
statute should be broad enough to provide flexibility to the implementing agency in promul-
gating its rules or regulations.”).
65. Scott, supra note 1, at 131 (quoting Challenges Facing the Federal Trade Commission:
Hearing on H.R. 68 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of
the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 12 (2001) (statement of Timothy J.
Muris, FTC Chairman)).
66. See id.
67. FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION, supra note 3, at app. at 175.
68. See Peter S. Frechette, Note, FTC v. LabMD: FTC Jurisdiction over Information
Privacy Is “Plausible,” but How Far Can It Go?, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1401, 1403-04 (2013).
69. See Snap Inc., SNAP INC., https://www.snap.com/en-US/ [https://perma.cc/JA38-XGP2].
70. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Order Settling Charges
Against Snapchat (Dec. 31, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/12/ftc-
approves-final-order-settling-charges-against-snapchat [https://perma.cc/UQN9-XU75].
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dicted its data security policies, or if it had not enacted any such
policies, then the FTC could not file a complaint under its deceptive-
ness power against that corporation.71 As a result, the FTC attempt-
ed to expand its reach in data security cases by using its unfairness
power to reach companies that maintained poor data security
practices without having breached any data security policies.72 This
overreach resulted in numerous settlements with companies under
investigation, including two major cases that apparently challenged
the FTC’s authority in vain.73
II. THE FTC’S DATA SECURITY CASES
A. Settlements and Consent Decrees
The FTC has settled more than fifty data security cases against
private companies since 2002, and it has used either its deceptive-
ness power or its unfairness power in each case.74 Some well-known
examples include those against Snapchat, Inc.,75 Twitter, Inc.,76 CVS
Pharmacy, Inc.,77 DSW, Inc.,78 and a number of other large corpora-
tions that have undergone major data breaches.79 Almost every data
71. Cf. Beales, supra note 6, at 192 (“Now, however, the FTC is using unfairness to attack
practices that cause substantial injury but that could not be reached under deception theory,
at least not without twisting the meaning of deception.”).
72. See id. at 195 (“The commission under Chairman Muris is now giving unfairness a
more prominent role as a powerful tool for the commission to analyze and attack a wider
range of practices that may not involve deception but nonetheless cause widespread and
significant consumer harm.”).
73. See infra Part II.B.
74. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1; Alden F. Abbott, The Federal Trade Com-
mission’s Role in Online Security: Data Protector or Dictator?, HERITAGE FOUND. LEGAL
MEMORANDUM, No. 137, Sept. 10, 2014, at 3, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/
LM137.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7RY-E8GQ].
75. See Decision & Order, Snapchat, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4501, at 1 (Dec. 23, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/141231snapchatdo.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YR3B-DUH4].
76. See Twitter, Inc., 151 F.T.C. 162, 170 (2011) (Decision & Order).
77. See Decision & Order, CVS Caremark Corp., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4259, at 1 (June 18,
2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/06/090623cvsdo.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/4H2L-WLDL].
78. See DSW, Inc., 141 F.T.C. 117, 121 (2006) (Decision & Order).
79. For more FTC settlements, search under the topic “data security cases” on Legal
Resources, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/legal-
resources?type=case&field_consumer_protection_topics_tid=249 [https://perma.cc/3QBV-SLYJ].
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security case pursued by the FTC has ended in settlement.80 These
settlements involve what are known as “consent orders,”81 or
“consent decrees.”82 In a consent decree, “a company agrees to cease
practices the FTC deems unlawful and to take various ‘corrective
measures’ to prevent future harm.”83 Corrective measures may
include “implementation of comprehensive privacy and security
programs, biennial assessments by independent experts, monetary
redress to consumers, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, deletion of
illegally obtained consumer information, and provision of robust
notice and choice mechanisms to consumers.”84
One example of a consent order can be found in the FTC’s
settlement with BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc.85 BJ’s Wholesale Club
agreed to, among other actions, “establish and implement, and
thereafter maintain, a comprehensive information security program
that is reasonably designed to protect” consumer data and fully doc-
ument virtually every detail of the program; “obtain an assessment
and report ... from a qualified, objective, independent third-party
professional” biennially for twenty years following the consent
order; and to maintain any documents relating to compliance for a
certain period of time depending on the document, as well as make
those documents available to the FTC upon request.86 This consent
order is effective for twenty years “from the most recent date that
the United States or the Federal Trade Commission files a com-
plaint ... in federal court alleging any violation of the order, which-
ever comes later.”87
80. See Jennifer Woods, Federal Trade Commission’s Privacy and Data Security
Enforcement Under Section 5, A.B.A. YOUNG LAW. DIV., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/federal_trade_commissions_priva
cy.html [https://perma.cc/UQ4R-VS9R].
81. See Scott, supra note 1, at 133.
82. Abbott, supra note 74.
83. Id.
84. FED. TRADE COMM’N, 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE (2015) [hereinafter
2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
reports/privacy-data-security-update-2014/privacydatasecurityupdate_2014.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3MCU-EQH6].
85. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465, 469 (2005) (Decision & Order).
86. Id. at 471-73.
87. Id. at 475.
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Another example of a consent order is the FTC’s settlement with
DSW, Inc.88 DSW underwent a breach several months before the
settlement that compromised the information of approximately
1,438,281 credit and debit card holders.89 On December 1, 2005, the
FTC filed a complaint against DSW alleging that this breach was a
result of the company’s inadequate business practices, namely its
failure to better secure credit card information by deleting informa-
tion that was no longer in use and by securing its computer
network.90 As a result, DSW entered into a settlement with the FTC
whereby DSW agreed to implement and maintain a comprehensive
security program “reasonably designed to protect the security,
confidentiality, and integrity of personal information collected from
or about consumers.”91 DSW also agreed to obtain biennial assess-
ments from a qualified third party for twenty years after the
consent order was implemented, to maintain each document related
to compliance and make those documents available to the FTC upon
request, to provide the consent order to any current and future
employee of the company whose position is in any way related to the
data security program, to file reports with the FTC at specified
times, and to notify the FTC of any changes to the corporation that
affect the data security program.92
What is striking about the FTC’s consent decrees is that they are
all nearly identical. For example, in the BJ’s Wholesale Club and
DSW cases, the consent decrees contained agreements to implement
comprehensive security programs, biennially obtain assessments
from third-party professionals, and make documents available to the
FTC upon request.93 Both consent decrees were also set to last for
twenty years.94 Not only are these provisions’ mandates the same,
but the language for each provision is very similar as well, indicat-
ing that the FTC applies the same, or at least nearly identical,
provisions to each data security case.95
88. See generally DSW, Inc., 141 F.T.C. 117, 117-20 (2006) (Complaint).
89. Id. at 120.
90. Id. at 119.
91. Id. at 123 (Decision & Order).
92. Id. at 124-27. 
93. Id. at 123-26; BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465, 471-73 (2005).
94. DSW, Inc., 141 F.T.C. at 127; BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. at 475.
95. Compare DSW, Inc., 141 F.T.C. at 123-27, with BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C.
at 470-75. See also Twitter, Inc., 151 F.T.C. 162, 172-77 (2011) (Decision & Order); Decision
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Although companies “agree” to these corrective measures, they do
not have much bargaining power. The final consent decrees are
nearly identical to the orders the FTC provides companies when it
first files a complaint.96 This is a further indication of the fact that
the FTC has institutional advantages over companies, and it shows
that consent decrees are boilerplate settlements that leave compa-
nies little room for negotiation.97 Despite this, only a few companies
refused to sign a consent order and, instead, took their cases all the
way to trial.98
B. Litigation: FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. and FTC v.
LabMD, Inc.
FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. and FTC v. LabMD, Inc., are
two examples of cases in which the companies under investigation
did not settle with the FTC.99 Rather than agreeing to sign consent
orders, Wyndham and LabMD challenged the FTC’s complaints
against them, as well as the FTC’s general authority to regulate
data security under its section 5 unfairness power.100
In Wyndham, hackers gained access to Wyndham’s computer
systems on three occasions between 2008 and 2009.101 The FTC
alleged that the breaches were a result of Wyndham’s unfair and
deceptive security practices,102 which “taken together, unreasonably
& Order, CVS Caremark Corp., supra note 77, at 3-6. For more examples of these consent
decrees, search under the topic “data security cases” at Legal Resources, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/legal-resources?type=case&field_
consumer_protection_topics_tid=249 [https://perma.cc/3QBV-SLYJ].
96. Compare Complaint, supra note 25, at 7-12, and Agreement Containing Consent
Order, BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., F.T.C. Matter No. 0423160, at 2-6 (May 17, 2005), https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/06/050616agree0423160.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VDZ6-9ES9], with Final Order, LabMD, Inc., supra note 30, and BJ’s Wholesale
Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. at 470-75.
97. See Wright, supra note 12, at 7 (asserting that the FTC has an institutional advantage
over companies). 
98. See infra Part II.B.
99. See generally FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015); Opinion
of the Commission, LabMD, Inc., supra note 29.
100. See Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 243-48; Initial Decision, LabMD, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No.
9357, at 3 (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/151113labmd_
decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/A62V-W7CL].
101. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 240-42.
102. Id. at 240.
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and unnecessarily exposed consumers’ personal data to unautho-
rized access and theft.”103 Wyndham filed a motion to dismiss the
section 5 claims, but the district court denied the motion and the
Third Circuit granted Wyndham’s application for appeal.104 In its
August 24, 2015, decision, the Third Circuit denied Wyndham’s
motion to dismiss.105
Wyndham made three major arguments: (1) the FTC had no
congressional authority to regulate cybersecurity; (2) the complaint
was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because the FTC failed to give companies fair notice of what
would constitute a breach; and (3) the three unfairness prongs were
necessary but not sufficient factors to consider in unfairness
cases.106 In response, the Third Circuit noted that Congress gave the
FTC its authority to regulate cybersecurity when it enacted the FTC
Act, and that subsequent congressional action had not taken away
that authority.107 Additionally, the Third Circuit held that the FTC
gave fair notice that Wyndham’s practices might be in violation of
section 45(a) simply by virtue of its language.108 It noted that
statutory ambiguity does not necessitate a lack of fair notice.109
Yet, the Third Circuit did not fully discount all of Wyndham’s
arguments. The court concluded by saying the three unfairness
prongs may, in fact, “be necessary rather than sufficient conditions”
for proving unfair acts or practices.110 Although the Third Circuit
still affirmed the district court’s holding,111 this opinion leaves the
extent of the FTC’s section 5 power open to more challenges. The
Third Circuit indicated that Wyndham was an easy case in which to
find unfair security practices.112 The court emphasized that “Wynd-
ham’s as-applied challenge [fell] well short given the allegations in
103. Id. (quoting Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief ¶ 24, Wyndham, 799
F.3d 236 (No.14-3514), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/06/120626
wyndamhotelscmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/E96C-PQK5]).
104. See id. at 242 (removing the case from the U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey).
105. Id. at 259. 
106. See id. at 244-49.
107. Id. at 243-44, 247-49. 
108. Id. at 255-56, 259.
109. Id. at 252.
110. Id. at 259.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 256.
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the FTC’s complaint” because, rather than arguing that Wyndham
had weak data security measures, the FTC argued that Wyndham
failed to use firewalls, encryption software, IP address restrictions,
or other security measures at all.113 The court also emphasized that
Wyndham’s system was hacked “not one or two, but three, times.”114
Wyndham does not give sufficient guidance for cases involving less
obvious breaches or data security issues because this case included
such strong evidence of a major breach in data security.
Moreover, Wyndham settled after the Third Circuit denied its
motion to dismiss, leaving the issues ultimately undecided.115 Thus,
Wyndham is not the be-all, end-all of the FTC’s power to regulate
data security under section 5. Alden Abbott, a former director of
antitrust for the FTC,116 argued that the Wyndham decision
in no way alters the fact that the FTC’s existing cybersecurity
enforcement program is inadequate and unsound. Whether
through guidelines or formal FTC rules ... the FTC should pro-
vide additional guidance to the private sector, rooted in sound
cost-benefit analysis. The FTC should also be ever mindful of the
costs it imposes on the economy (including potential burdens on
business innovation) whenever it considers bringing enforcement
actions in this area.117
Another company that challenged the FTC’s authority is LabMD,
Inc.118 LabMD is a small cancer detection lab in Atlanta, Georgia,
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Wyndham Settles FTC Charges It Unfairly Placed Consumers’ Payment Card
Information at Risk, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 9, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2015/12/wyndham-settles-ftc-charges-it-unfairly-placed-
consumers-payment [https://perma.cc/H63P-CLP6].
116. Alden Abbott is the Deputy Director of the Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and
Judicial Studies and the John, Barbara, and Victoria Rumpel Senior Legal Fellow at the
Heritage Foundation. Alden Abbott, HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/a/
alden-abbott [https://perma.cc/AM7D-G8FT].
117. Alden Abbott, Wyndham Decision Highlights FTC Role in Cybersecurity: Legal and
Policy Considerations, TRUTH ON MKT. (Sept. 1, 2015) (emphasis added), http://truthonthe
market.com/2015/09/01/wyndham-decision-highlights-ftc-role-in-cybersecurity-legal-and-
policy-considerations/ [https://perma.cc/893M-T7FQ].
118. See Respondent LabMD, Inc.’s Answer and Defenses to Administrative Complaint,
LabMD, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. 9357, at 1 (Sept. 17, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/cases/578519.pdf [https://perma.cc/U47K-32ZL].
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that used to test specimen samples sent by health care providers.119
LabMD opened in 1966 and had a mere twenty employees.120 In May
2008, a third party informed LabMD that the personal information
of about 9300 patients was available on a P2P network, Limewire,
an application commonly used to share music, videos, and pic-
tures.121 The billing department manager had downloaded Limewire
to the company’s billing computer no later than 2006, and upon
learning of the wide availability of its information on the network
in May 2008, LabMD immediately removed the application from the
computer.122 Four years later, in October 2012, California convicted
several individuals on charges of identity theft after the Sacramento
Police Department found certain LabMD day sheets and a few
copied checks, payable to LabMD, in their possession.123
The FTC filed a complaint against LabMD in August 2013, alleg-
ing that LabMD violated the unfairness provision of section 5 by
failing to put in place reasonable and appropriate data security
measures.124 Like Wyndham, LabMD attempted to have the com-
plaint dismissed, arguing that LabMD did not engage in unfair
practices and that the FTC did not have the power to regulate data
security under section 5 of the FTC Act.125 Chief ALJ D. Michael
Chappell found that the FTC has congressional authority to
regulate data security, that it has repeatedly affirmed its authority
by filing actions in data security cases, and that no other legislation
has precluded the FTC from bringing such actions.126 Further,
Chappell held that the FTC had the discretion to apply the unfair-
ness doctrine on a case-by-case basis, and that this case did not
119. See Complaint, supra note 25, at 1; Abbott, supra note 74, at 5.
120. Cheryl Conner, When the Government Closes Your Business, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2014,
5:55 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/cherylsnappconner/2014/02/01/when-the-government-
closes-your-business/ [https://perma.cc/M3ZE-YFQ4].
121. Complaint, supra note 25, at 4.
122. Id. at 4-5.
123. Id. at 5.
124. Id.
125. Respondent LabMD, Inc.’s Answer and Defenses to Administrative Complaint, supra
note 118, at 1, 6.
126. Order Denying Respondent LabMD’s Motion to Dismiss, LabMD, Inc., F.T.C. Docket
No. 9357, at 3, 6, 10 (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/
140117labmdorder.pdf [https://perma.cc/EVF8-ESNZ].
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violate LabMD’s due process right under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.127
As for whether LabMD engaged in unfair practices, Chappell
initially held that it did not.128 He noted that even if harm was
“possible,” the FTC did not establish that substantial harm was
“likely” to occur, which is the first requirement under the unfairness
test.129 He reasoned that the patient information was only available
for a short time, and that any harm that could have occurred was
subjective and speculative.130 Chappell also found that the FTC did
not provide sufficient evidence to find that the theft of the day
sheets and checks from the California incident were in any way
connected to the P2P file-sharing network or a lack of data security
measures.131 Much of the stolen information was not in the P2P file,
and some of the information was actually stolen before LabMD
started inputting the data in question.132
The FTC appealed, and a majority of the commission mem-
bers—including Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, Maureen K. Ohlhaus-
en, and Terrell McSweeny—reversed the initial decision and re-
leased a final order and a corresponding opinion statement on July
28, 2016.133 The Commission first held that actual harm resulted
from the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive health or medical
information.134 It then considered, notwithstanding its holding, that
substantial harm to consumers was likely, and that Chappell fol-
lowed the wrong standard in determining this prong of the unfair-
ness test.135 The Commission ultimately found that LabMD engaged
in unfair data security practices because it did not train its IT
personnel or its other employees on proper data security practices,
and that it did not maintain adequate monitoring practices, such as
installing software that could detect vulnerabilities in the system.136
127. Id. at 15. 
128. Initial Decision, LabMD, Inc., supra note 100, at 88. 
129. Id. at 54-55.
130. Id. at 85.
131. Id. at 13.
132. See id. at 72-73.
133. Final Order, LabMD, Inc., supra note 30, at 1; Opinion of the Commission, LabMD,
Inc., supra note 29, at 1.
134. Opinion of the Commission, LabMD, Inc., supra note 29, at 19.
135. Id. at 20-21, 25.
136. Id. at 11-15.
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The only matter on which the Commission agreed with Chappell
was that there was not enough information to determine that the
California incident was LabMD’s fault.137
LabMD spent so much money on litigation that it had no choice
but to stop accepting new patients and to begin winding down opera-
tions in January 2014.138 It now exists merely to store test results
from previous patients and provide those results upon request.139
What is striking about the final order, and what makes it so
surprising when compared to Wyndham, is that LabMD was not a
large company conducting business in a large geographic area; rath-
er, LabMD was a small business with only twenty employees.140
Furthermore, the 9300 patient files on the P2P network constituted
only 1 percent of its patient information,141 the file was available
only for a short time, and LabMD removed the software as soon as
it learned that an employee had downloaded it onto one of LabMD’s
computers.142 In contrast, Wyndham is a large, international com-
pany that accumulates more and more credit card information every
day.143 The potential for harm was enormous, and Wyndham
underwent three major data security breaches.144 Despite these dif-
ferences, LabMD never stood a chance against the FTC.
LabMD underscores the FTC’s tremendous institutional bias.145
Former Commissioner Joshua D. Wright noted in February 2015
that “in 100 percent of cases where the administrative law judge
ruled in favor of the FTC staff, the Commission affirmed liability;
and in 100 percent of the cases in which the administrative law
judge ... found no liability, the Commission reversed.”146 This insti-
tutional bias could serve as grounds for other companies to chal-
lenge the FTC’s section 5 unfairness power in future data security
cases.
137. See id. at 25.
138. See id. at 4.
139. See id.
140. Conner, supra note 120.
141. Initial Decision, LabMD Inc., supra note 100, at 20 (noting that LabMD stored the
personal information of a total of 750 thousand patients).
142. Id. at 65.
143. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015).
144. Id. at 241-42.
145. See Wright, supra note 12, at 6-7 (discussing the FTC’s institutional bias).
146. Id. at 6. This statistic held true for LabMD, as well. See Final Order, LabMD, Inc.,
supra note 30, at 1 (reversing the ALJ’s dismissal of the FTC’s complaint against LabMd).
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C. The Unfairness Test Today
In data security cases, the FTC applies the same unfairness test
it codified in 1994:
The Commission shall have no authority under this section or
section 57a of this title to declare unlawful an act or practice on
the grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or
practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consum-
ers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves
and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or
to competition. In determining whether an act or practice is
unfair, the Commission may consider established public policies
as evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Such public
policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such
determination.147
The FTC has had little opportunity to reveal how it applies the
unfairness test because almost every one of its data security cases
has ended in a settlement.148 Businesses have only two sources from
which to draw information when attempting to discern how the FTC
will apply this test: the few data security cases that have challenged
the FTC and the few pieces of literature the FTC has released over
time that attempt to explain the test. The test in its current form is
vague, and it is applied unpredictably and inconsistently on a case-
by-case basis.149 The following is an explanation of the test as it
appears to apply today based upon the limited resources available. 
The first prong is that “the ... practice causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers.”150 Most cases will involve mone-
tary harm, but the injury could also be “[u]nwarranted health or
safety risks.”151 Emotional harm is never a factor.152 The question,
then, turns on what “substantial injury” means.
147. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (1994), with id. (2012) (using identical language).
148. Woods, supra note 80.
149. Wright, supra note 12, at 5-7, 10. 
150. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012); see FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS, supra note 44,
at app. at 1073.
151. FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS, supra note 44, at app. at 1073.
152. Id.
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In the FTC’s 1980 Policy Statement on Unfairness, it stated that
a substantial injury does not include harm that is “trivial or merely
speculative.”153 Since then, the FTC has continued to argue that an
actual breach is not required for the FTC to meet the first prong of
the unfairness test.154
For example, in LabMD the FTC filed a complaint alleging that
LabMD violated section 5 of the FTC Act by engaging in unfair acts
or practices even though the record contained no evidence of actual
injury.155 The FTC’s justification for filing a complaint was that
section 5 of the FTC Act allows for a mere “likelihood” of substantial
injury and that LabMD’s data security practices unfairly exposed
consumers’ data.156 Chairwoman Ramirez held in the Opinion of the
Commission that the “privacy harm resulting from the unauthorized
disclosure of sensitive health or medical information is in and of
itself a substantial injury.”157
Notwithstanding the holding, Chairwoman Ramirez went on to
discuss whether there was a substantial likelihood of injury.158 She
stated that Chief ALJ Chappell applied the wrong standard to this
question when he held that harm had to be probable, not just pos-
sible, in order to be likely.159 She held instead that harm is likely if
there is a “significant risk” of harm, and she repeatedly emphasized
that even though the harm may be contained to a small number of
consumers, a practice may still be unfair as long as the impact to
those consumers is great.160 Chairwoman Ramirez also noted that
subjective harm may be considered in this analysis “in extreme
cases.”161
Despite the final holding in LabMD, the future application of the
first prong is unclear. The LabMD rule applies only to those cases
involving “sensitive health or medical information.”162 Any other
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, LabMD, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. 9357, at 3
(June 6, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/570399.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z72S-25CL].
155. See Initial Decision, LabMD, Inc., supra note 100, at 52.
156. See Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, LabMD, Inc., supra note 154, at 3-7.
157. Opinion of the Commission, LabMD, Inc., supra note 29, at 19.
158. See id. at 20.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 10, 20-21.
161. Id. at 10.
162. See id. at 19.
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type of information would be subject to the “significant risk” stan-
dard, which is vague and could easily be manipulated by ALJs to
mean anything.163 Also, in cases involving subjective harm, there is
no clear understanding of which cases ALJs will consider to be
“extreme.”164 But the first prong is not the only vague portion of the
unfairness test. 
The second prong of the unfairness test is that “the injury must
not be outweighed by any offsetting consumer or competitive
benefits that the sales practice also produces.”165 In the FTC’s 1980
Policy Statement, it recognized that companies make “tradeoffs” for
the benefit of business.166 For example, “[a] seller’s failure to present
complex technical data on his product may lessen a consumer’s
ability to choose ... but may also reduce the initial price he must pay
for the article.”167 Such tradeoffs include not only burdens to indi-
vidual consumers, but also burdens to society.168 The basic require-
ments are that businesses must supply consumers with sufficient
information, and they cannot exert undue influence over the
consumers.169 When considering this prong, the FTC claims it
“take[s] into account the cost to remedy the alleged injury to the
parties involved, as well as ‘the burdens on society in general in the
form of increased paperwork, increased regulatory burdens on the
flow of information, reduced incentives to innovation and capital
formation, and similar matters.’”170
163. See id. at 21 (explaining the “significant risk” standard). 
164. See id. at 10. Although Chairwoman Ramirez provides “abusive debt collection
practices” and “high pressure sales tactics” as examples of “extreme cases” in which subjective
harm may be considered by the FTC, they are merely examples that exist in a congressional
report and an FTC guidance statement, not examples of subjective harm that have been
considered in actual cases. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. 103-130, at 13 (1993)). Furthermore,
these are only examples that may be applied to the unfairness test, not examples that must
be applied. See id. The statement that “subjective types of harm might well be considered as
the basis for a finding of unfairness” in “extreme cases” is vague on its face and leaves
companies unable to determine the strength of their cases if they choose to challenge the FTC.
See id.




169. Id. at app. at 1074.
170. Scott, supra note 1, at 159 (quoting FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS, supra
note 44, at app. at 1073-74).
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Exactly how this prong plays out is still largely unknown because
the FTC has settled almost all of its data security cases.171
Wyndham and LabMD provide little guidance. Because Wyndham
involved three major breaches and a significant amount of harm, it
is unhelpful for understanding how the FTC will apply the second
prong to smaller businesses or cases involving minor data security
issues.172
As for LabMD, Chairwoman Ramirez emphasized the existence
of relatively low-cost tools that could have been implemented by
LabMD, and she balanced that against what she considered to be
substantial harm to consumers, ultimately deciding that harm to
consumers outweighed the cost to LabMD.173 She stated that this
was a clear case of harm to consumers outweighing the harm to the
company, but her reasoning was based on an unprecedented finding:
that the release of any medical information through any medium
constitutes actual, substantial harm.174 Moreover, Chairwoman
Ramirez’s reasoning appeared to be based on the assumption that
LabMD should have known that its software was insufficient or that
its IT staff did not already have the proper training.175 The way she
applied the first two prongs does make the harm to consumers
substantially outweigh any burden on LabMD, but, again, the FTC
possesses significant institutional bias,176 and LabMD can still
appeal the final order. Moreover, how the FTC will apply this prong
in cases with a mere likelihood of harm, or just a different type of
harm, remains a mystery.
The third prong of the unfairness test is that “the injury must be
one which consumers could not reasonably have avoided.”177 An
injury is reasonably avoidable by consumers when consumers can
make their own decisions based on the market.178 In its 1980 Policy
Statement on Unfairness, the FTC emphasized that consumer
choice is what governs the market and that this effect should be
171. See supra Part II.A. 
172. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 241-42 (3d Cir. 2015).
173. See Opinion of the Commission, LabMD, Inc., supra note 29, at 26-28.
174. See id. at 19, 28.
175. See id. at 12-16.
176. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
177. FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS, supra note 44, at app. at 1073-74.
178. Id.
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“self-correcting.”179 If consumers chose not to avoid the injury, then
“it would be paternalistic for the FTC to step in and protect them.”180
The FTC should only step in when there is an “obstacle to the free
exercise of consumer decisionmaking.”181 This includes certain sales
techniques that make consumers unable to fairly consider their
options before choosing to participate in the market.182
Once again, the FTC has not had much opportunity to apply the
third prong in unfairness cases because of the lack of litigation.183 In
Wyndham, the argument on prong three revolved around deceptive
practices rather than unfair practices, which invoke a different test
entirely.184 LabMD, however, provides some minimal level of guid-
ance. In LabMD, Chairwoman Ramirez held that “consumers had
no ability to avoid the harms caused by LabMD’s practices” because
the patients were not directly tied to LabMD.185 Instead, LabMD’s
clients were the physicians and other health care providers that
drew the samples from their patients.186 The patients could not
choose where to send their samples, and they were not “reasonably
capable of mitigating any injury ‘after the fact’” because LabMD
failed to provide them with notice of the breach.187 What is left
unanswered is whether LabMD could have won on the third prong
if it had provided notice or if Commissioner Ramirez would have
found for LabMD on this issue if the patients themselves chose
where to send their samples for testing. Outside of the specific facts
of this case, it is difficult to know how the FTC will apply this prong
in future cases.
179. Id.
180. Dennis D. Hirsch, That’s Unfair! Or Is It? Big Data Discrimination and the FTC’s
Unfairness Authority, 103 KY. L.J. 345, 354 (2014).
181. FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS, supra note 44, at app. at 1074; see Beales,
supra note 6, at 196.
182. See FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS, supra note 44, at app. at 1074.
183. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
184. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 245-46 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[C]onsumers
could not reasonably avoid injury by booking with another hotel chain because Wyndham had
published a misleading privacy policy that overstated its cybersecurity.”).
185. Opinion of the Commission, LabMD, Inc., supra note 29, at 25.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 25-26.
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III. THE ANTITRUST RULE OF REASON AS A GUIDELINE FOR

















t Application of the Unfairness Test Harms
The FTC’s invasive data security initiatives harm small and
independently owned businesses when the FTC fails to adequately
tailor its investigation to each company or organization.188 The
initiatives harm these businesses by hindering their ability to
successfully compete in the market.189 Alden Abbott, the former
director of antitrust policy for the FTC, argues that “data security
investigations that are not tailored to the size and capacity of the
[company] may impose competitive disadvantages on smaller rivals
in industries in which data protection issues are paramount.”190 This
is because larger companies have the ability and resources to sup-
port more expensive and invasive provisions in consent decrees.191
In fact, it may even be in the interest of larger companies to do so.
Abbott discusses a concept known as a “raising rivals’ costs” strate-
gy, a method of competition whereby larger companies take on costs
that would either eliminate smaller companies or substantially
harm them in a manner that virtually removes them from competi-
tion.192 In the end, such a strategy harms consumers who must then
pay more for goods and services that might be lower in quality.193
Hindering the ability of small businesses to successfully compete
in the market is particularly harmful to the economy because small
businesses contribute to economic growth.194 Increased regulation
harms small businesses because it disproportionately affects them.
Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch argues that the FTC’s final 2012
Privacy Report “repeatedly sides with consumer organizations and
188. See, e.g., supra notes 119-45 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
190. Abbott, supra note 74, at 5.
191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting David T. Scheffman & Richard S. Higgins, Twenty Years of Raising Rivals’
Costs: History, Assessment, and Future, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 371 (2003)).
193. Id.
194. See George L. Priest, Essay, Small Business, Economic Growth, and the Huffman Con-
jecture, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 2 (2003).
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large enterprises.”195 Commissioner Rosch also argues that the FTC
should only apply section 5 in cases of “monopoly or near-monopoly
power.”196 Otherwise, large companies with such power will use
privacy as a “weapon” against other businesses, thereby harming
competition.197 The following Sections provide examples of how the
FTC’s proposed data security measures harm small companies.
1. The Unfairness Test Is Vague, and the FTC’s Current
Application of It Is Unpredictable
The FTC currently takes an ad hoc approach in choosing which
unfair acts or practices to pursue.198 This approach is problematic
because the unfairness test itself is already “vague and ambiguous,”
and companies cannot easily anticipate what constitutes a breach.199
Former Commissioner Wright noted in February 2015 that the FTC
failed to commit to a stable definition of what makes particular data
security acts or practices unfair.200 This is the case even though
commissioners across the political spectrum agree that a “principled
standard” for such would be a “welcome improvement.”201 Even
Commissioner Rosch is skeptical of the FTC using the unfairness
power in data security cases because of its vagueness and subjec-
tiveness.202
Current application of the unfairness test is burdensome to small
businesses because businesses can be punished for taking actions
they did not know would constitute a breach. This, in turn, hurts
the market because businesses cannot stay in the market and help
increase competition. Although Wyndham is not direct evidence of
this conclusion because Wyndham’s breach was so egregious, Wynd-
195. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS C-4 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 PRIVACY
REPORT] (Rosch, Comm’r, dissenting), https://www.ftc.gov/sites /default /files /documents /
reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-
recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/YN4F-3839].
196. Id. at C-5.
197. Id. at C-4 to C-5.




202. See 2012 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 195, at C-3 (Rosch, Comm’r, dissenting) (“‘Un-
fairness’ is an elastic and elusive concept. What is ‘unfair’ is in the eye of the beholder.”).
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ham provides a helpful framework for understanding how the FTC’s
ALJs, Commissioners, and other courts may approach the issue of
notice. Wyndham argued that the FTC could not file a complaint
against it because it was never put on notice.203 The Third Circuit
held that the FTC gave sufficient notice because Wyndham was not
entitled to know what the FTC’s interpretation of section 5 would be
with “ascertainable certainty.”204 Instead, the relevant question was
“whether Wyndham had fair notice that its conduct could fall within
the meaning of the statute.”205 Wyndham’s acts and practices were
so extreme that they clearly fell within the fair notice requirement
because Wyndham sustained three major breaches in a short
amount of time.206
LabMD, on the other hand, was found to be engaging in unfair
acts or practices for actions that were not so obvious. LabMD had
security software on its computers, its employees used passwords,
and it had IT staff.207 The problem, according to Chairwoman
Ramirez, was that LabMD did not update its software, routinely run
checks to detect vulnerabilities, train its IT staff on data security
issues, or train its employees to have better security practices, in-
`cluding more secure passwords.208 Aside from noting that LabMD
failed to provide regular data security training to its employees, as
set forth in its compliance manual, Chairwoman Ramirez did not
appear to even consider whether LabMD was aware that its
practices were insufficient.209 Instead, she placed a great deal of
emphasis on the fact that proper security measures could have been
implemented with little cost to LabMD.210 But the mere existence of
low-cost security measures does not mean that LabMD should have
known of them or was on notice that it should implement those
measures. Thus, LabMD does not necessarily clear up which acts or
practices the FTC will consider “unfair.”
The lack of clarity on what constitutes a breach is apparent in
other cases as well. In the FTC’s case against HTC America, Inc.,
203. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 2015).
204. Id. at 251.
205. Id. at 255.
206. See id. at 255-56.
207. Opinion of the Commission, LabMD, Inc., supra note 29, at 11-16.
208. Id.
209. See generally id.
210. Id. at 11-16.
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the FTC charged HTC with a failure to provide reasonable and
appropriate security in the design of its smartphone software.211
However, the FTC did not cite any specific harmful security breach-
es to justify such sanctions.212 The decree did not even explain what
specific steps short of the decree requirements would have been
deemed “reasonable.”213
Even the consent decrees do not provide sufficient notice. As
stated previously, the consent decrees are all nearly identical.214
Moreover, the language of the consent decrees provides little guid-
ance because they merely state that the companies should imple-
ment “a comprehensive information security program.”215 This does
not even inform the companies actually signing the consent decrees
of what constitutes adequate security practices.
Without knowing what constitutes unfair security acts or
practices, small companies will be blindsided by the FTC, and that
itself is unfair.
2. The FTC’s Proposed Data Security Measures Are Too Costly
with Little Incentive to Challenge Them
The FTC’s proposed security measures impose a disproportion-
ately high cost to smaller or independently owned businesses. The
actual cost for such security measures varies based on the type of
business and the way it is run. One company in Utah gave an
estimate of how much a small business should spend on data
211. See Complaint, HTC Am., Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4406, at 2 (Feb. 22, 2013), https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130702htccmpt.pdf [https://perma.
cc/F4ZU-4V8W].
212. Alden Abbott stated,
The HTC settlement exemplifies the FTC’s “security by design” approach to data
security. This approach informs firms after the fact what they should have done
without exploring what they might have done to pass agency muster. It is
inherently vague and puts the FTC in the position of being a “data security
systems designer.”
Abbott, supra note 74, at 4.
213. Id.
214. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. 
215. See, e.g., Final Order, LabMD, Inc., supra note 30, at 2; DSW, Inc., 141 F.T.C. 117, 123
(2006) (Decision & Order); BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465, 470-71 (2005) (Decision
& Order).
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security: roughly “$57,600 a year for a 50-employee company.”216
This includes secure e-mail hosting, an antivirus service, online
backup, a secure Internet phone system, and labor costs.217 Further-
more, each of these is calculated on a per-employee basis.218 The less
tech-savvy a business is, and the more it needs to rely on IT staff or
outsourcing, the greater the costs will be.219
Most of the consent decrees the FTC issues pose a significant
burden on businesses, far beyond what smaller companies can
sustain in time, money, and available resources—that is, knowl-
edgeable technology and support staff. The FTC action involving
TRENDnet is one example of a disproportionately burdensome
consent decree for a problem that the company had seemingly
resolved.220 TRENDnet is a California company that, among other
things, sells networking devices to individuals and small- and mid-
sized businesses.221 The TRENDnet, Inc., case involved security
cameras the company sold for customers to use inside their
houses.222 In January 2012, hackers invaded 700 customers’ security
cameras and opened up each of those systems on a live feed.223
TRENDnet quickly released new software to eliminate the problem,
and it encouraged consumers to install the new software.224
Thereafter, the FTC filed its complaint against TRENDnet.225 The
company argued that it took reasonable steps to ensure its cameras
were secure, which the FTC contended was a misrepresentation.226
Only a few months later, TRENDnet signed a consent decree in
which the company agreed, among other actions, to implement an
entirely new security program, acquire outside audits, and notify






220. See Complaint, TRENDnet, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4426, at 5 (Jan. 16, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140207trendnetcmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UR23-PRK7].
221. Id. at 1.
222. Id. at 2.
223. Id. at 5.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1.
226. Id. at 6.
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customers about these new policies, as well as the company’s new
software capabilities.227 TRENDnet also agreed to provide its affect-
ed customers with free technical support for the next two years and
to acquire biennial third-party assessments of its security measures
for the next twenty years.228
Although the FTC maintains that it considers the scale and
resources of each company when it begins an investigation,229 it does
not appear to do so in practice. Again, the TRENDnet consent decree
is substantially similar to the other FTC consent decrees.230 Refer
again to the case of LabMD. Although LabMD is a small company,
the proposed consent decree provided at the outset was substan-
tially similar to those of other, larger companies, like BJ’s Whole-
sale Club.231 Moreover, the consent decrees and proposed consent
decrees in cases involving major breaches are practically identical
to those in cases like LabMD and TRENDnet, in which the compa-
nies under investigation had already taken steps to remedy data
security problems.232
Despite this, small businesses can afford neither to challenge nor
concede to these consent decrees. As stated previously, LabMD
spent so much money on litigation that it was forced to wind down
and eventually end its operations.233 LabMD expended enormous
costs challenging the FTC in a case in which the FTC could show no
evidence of patient harm, or that there was even a substantial
likelihood of harm.234 In addition to ceasing its operations, LabMD
227. Decision & Order, TRENDnet, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4426, at 4-6 (Jan. 16, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140207trendnetdo.pdf [https://perma.cc/
83LR-Y74Q].
228. See id. at 6-7.
229. See 2012 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 195, at 9.
230. See supra Part II.A.
231. See Abbott, supra note 74, at 5. For example, compare Complaint, LabMD, Inc., supra
note 25, at 7-9, with Decision & Order, TRENDnet, Inc., supra note 227, at 4-6.
232. See Complaint, TRENDnet, Inc., supra note 220, at 5 (identifying that TRENDnet
seemingly resolved the problem as soon as it discovered the problem by releasing new
software to block hacking); Complaint, LabMD, Inc., supra note 25, at 4-5 (identifying that
LabMD uninstalled Limewire from the computer as soon as it learned of the breach).
233. See Abbott, supra note 74, at 5; Epstein, supra note 23.
234. See Initial Decision, LabMD, Inc., supra note 100, at 92.
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suffered reputational damage by publicly wrestling with FTC
ligigation for six years.235
The FTC also fails to take account of the fact that these compa-
nies must sustain the additional burdens that state regulations
impose. In the realm of data security, many states impose a notice
requirement on businesses, whereby, in the event of a breach,
businesses must inform each and every customer whose private
information is compromised.236 Whether such state regulations are
good or bad, and whether the state should even regulate data
security at all, are separate questions entirely. For purposes of this
Note, such regulations should be simply viewed as additional
burdens which only make the weight of FTC consent decrees that
much more difficult for small companies to bear.
Ultimately, businesses have little incentive to challenge the FTC.
Even LabMD, which won at the initial stage, lost on appeal at the
hands of the FTC’s institutional bias.237 Former Commissioner
Wright discussed this bias at the FTC’s February 2015 symposium
on section 5 of the FTC Act.238 He argued that one “strong sign of an
unhealthy and biased institutional process” is that “in 100 percent
of cases where the administrative law judge ruled in favor of the
FTC staff, the Commission affirmed liability; and in 100 percent of
the cases in which the administrative law judge ... found no liability,
the Commission reversed.”239 Former Commissioner Wright also
argued that “the combination of institutional and procedural
advantages with the vague nature of the Commission’s section 5
authority gives the agency the ability, in some cases, to elicit a
settlement even though the conduct in question very likely may not
be anticompetitive.”240 Those settlements, in turn, perpetuate the
process by which the FTC regulates unfair acts or practices because
235. See C. Ryan Barber, Medical Company LabMD Sues FTC Lawyers over Data-Privacy
Case, NAT’L L.J. (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202743147127/
Medical-Company-LabMD-Sues-FTC-Lawyers-Over-DataPrivacy-Case?slreturn=20160122
150652 [https://perma.cc/TC5N-56BB].
236. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.82-.83 (West 2017); FLA. STAT.
§§ 282.318(3)(i), 501.171(2) (2017); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW. § 899-aa (LexisNexis 2017); N.Y.
STATE TECH. LAW § 208 (LexisNexis 2017).
237. See Final Order, LabMD, Inc., supra note 30, at 1.
238. See Wright, supra note 12, at 6.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 7.
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settlements do not allow for any meaningful discussion on or chal-
lenge to the FTC’s authority.241
3. The FTC’s Proposed Data Security Measures Harm
Innovation
The FTC’s invasive data security measures pose a serious threat
to innovation.242 Threats to innovation, in turn, harm competition,
consequently harming consumers.243 The FTC has set forth a num-
ber of policy statements explaining what it deems to constitute good
security practices.244 One of its suggestions is that companies should
dispose of private information for which they have no use after a
certain period of time.245 Although the FTC claims that this time
limit for disposal is flexible depending on the company, not all of the
FTC commissioners are convinced.246 Commissioner Ohlhausen
argued that limiting the use of personal data to each particular task
and then disposing of it afterwards would pose a harm to science-
and technology-based companies that rely on this information for
data collection and research.247 This is direct evidence that the
FTC’s regulations simply cannot function as a one-size-fits-all
approach.
These proposed measures will harm innovation. To demonstrate,
consider companies like TRENDnet, which are involved in what is
known as the “Internet-of-Things.”248 The “Internet-of-Things” is “a
category of consumer products with their own interconnectivity to
the Internet and other electronic devices.”249 With too many
241. See id.
242. See Abbott, supra note 74, at 4.
243. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach to
Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175, 175-78 (2007) (stating that innovation is important to
consumers because consumers want options).
244. See, e.g., 2012 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 195, at 28.
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Power of Data,
Remarks at the Georgetown University McCourt School of Public Policy and Georgetown Law
Center: Privacy Principles in the Era of Massive Data (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/public_statements/299801/140422georgetownbigdataprivacy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WN7W-YJCZ].
247. See id. at 12-13.
248. Abbott, supra note 74, at 6.
249. Id.
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restrictions on what companies can do with private data, not only
will companies be disincentivized to develop new “Internet-of-
Things” technology, but also they may even be restricted from doing
so.250 And these are services consumers desire, especially in today’s
highly technology-based society.251 Thus, innovation should be a
consideration in the application of the unfairness prongs.252
B. A New Framework
The FTC should change the way it applies the second prong of its
analysis in order to improve the way it regulates potentially unfair
data security acts or practices. Instead of its current practices, the
FTC should apply an analysis similar to its Sherman Act of 1890
(Sherman Act) antitrust rule of reason analysis when analyzing the
balancing prong of the unfairness test.253 The Sherman Act makes
illegal “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States.”254
The Supreme Court first endorsed the rule of reason as the test
for applying section 1 of the Sherman Act in the case of Standard
Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States.255 The content of that test
“began to take shape” in Chicago Board of Trade, a 1918 case.256 In
that case, Justice Brandeis held that “[t]he true test of legality” is
whether the restraint imposed promotes or suppresses competi-
tion.257 According to the Supreme Court, that question requires a
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. Alden Abbott noted:
Missing from the consent decree calculus is the question of whether the benefits
in diminished data security breaches justify those costs—a question that should
be at the heart of unfairness analysis. There are no indications that the FTC has
even asked this question in fashioning data security consents, let alone made
case-specific cost-benefit analyses.
Id. at 4-5.
253. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911).
254. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
255. 221 U.S. at 66.
256. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); see also Andrew I. Gavil, Moving
Beyond Caricature and Characeriziation: The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL.
L. REV. 733, 742 (2012).
257. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
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consideration of “the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or pro-
bable.”258 Justice Brandeis acknowledged that “restraints on com-
petition may often be a valuable and integral part of business
arrangements, and that not all restraints should be condemned.”259
The main purpose for applying a rule of reason analysis is to draw
a distinction between anticompetitive acts or practices and conduct
that is efficient for businesses.260 A plaintiff must prove the fol-
lowing three elements to bring a section 1 claim under the Sherman
Act: “(1) that there was a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2)
that the agreement unreasonably restrained trade under either a
per se rule of illegality or a rule of reason analysis; and (3) that the
restraint affected interstate commerce.”261 In sum, “[a] restraint
violates the rule of reason if the restraint’s harm to competition
outweighs its procompetitive effects,” which is similar to the
balancing prong of the unfairness test.262
Under the rule of reason, courts apply a balancing test that
involves a burden-shifting framework.263 First, the plaintiff must
show that the restraint has significant anticompetitive effects.264
Then, if the plaintiff succeeds, the defendant must show the
legitimate procompetitive effects of the restraint.265 Finally, if the
defendant succeeds, the burden is shifted back to the plaintiff, who
must show that the defendant could meet those objectives through
less restrictive means.266 If the plaintiff meets its burden, then the
258. Id.
259. Gavil, supra note 256, at 742 (citing Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238).
260. By “the new rules of reason,” Gavil means the rule of reason as it exists today and not
in 1911. See id. at 735.
261. Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hairston v.
Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996)); accord In re Ins. Brokerage
Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 315 (3d Cir. 2010) (requiring the plaintiff to show (1) “that the
defendant was a party to a contract, combination ... or conspiracy” and (2) “that the conspiracy
to which the defendant was a party imposed an unreasonable restraint on trade” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530
F.3d 204, 218 (3d Cir. 2008))).
262. Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063 (citing Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319).
263. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1070 (9th Cir. 2015);
see also In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d at 316.
264. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1070.
265. See id.
266. See id.
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plaintiff wins the case.267 If not, the court steps in and weighs the
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of such a restraint.268
When applying this approach to the second prong of the unfair-
ness test, courts should use a similar analysis. First, the FTC must
show substantial harm or a likelihood of substantial harm, as
evidenced by the LabMD analysis above.269 If the FTC succeeds,
then the burden will be on the company to show how the FTC’s
action against it is actually anticompetitive. This may be shown by
(1) providing evidence that the FTC sanction will run the company
out of business or severely hamper its ability to conduct business,
and (2) providing evidence that the harms to the company will
ultimately harm the market by providing consumers with fewer
choices. The evidence will include considerations of the cost of im-
plementing more sophisticated data security measures, whether the
company remedied any problems, how its practices compare against
those of other companies with a similar size and purpose, how an
FTC consent order will hinder the company’s willingness and ability
to innovate, whether the company could have reasonably known
that its practices would warrant an FTC action, whether this action
would significantly reduce the company’s business or shut it down
altogether, and other similar concerns. If there is a sufficient finding
that the FTC’s enforcement action is anticompetitive, then it will be
up to the FTC to prove with certainty that the harm to consumers
and competition caused by the company’s actions are substantially
more anticompetitive than the FTC’s regulation of such actions.
The FTC should conduct this analysis on its own before it decides
to even file the complaint. Otherwise, the cost of litigating a weak
FTC case will only pose an additional burden on these businesses,
which will be especially detrimental if the businesses are smaller.
The cost of business practices needs to “clearly outweigh” any
benefits before the FTC can go after the business.270
267. See Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 604 (1988) (Opinion of the
Commission); Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999
BYU L. REV. 1265, 1268.
268. See Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. at 604; Carrier, supra note 267,
at 1268-69.
269. See Initial Decision, LabMD, Inc., supra note 100, at 92.
270. See Abbott, supra note 74, at 9.
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C. Why This Framework?
As the unfairness test stands today, any cost-benefit analysis
engaged in by the FTC is meaningless because the FTC is ignoring
key considerations, such as the effect of an enforcement action on
the market, which ultimately impacts consumers. Adding the rule
of reason analysis to the balancing portion of the unfairness test
forces the FTC to at least think about the broader impact of an
enforcement action. This is especially important in cases involving
potential, rather than actual, harm to consumers.
Additionally, this new emphasis on cost-benefit analysis will
provide more clarity for businesses on what the FTC expects out of
them.271 There is not much existing judicial guidance, and the un-
certainty businesses face is costly. Uncertainty costs businesses
money, time, and resources to implement measures they may or
may not need because they are merely guessing. Furthermore,
uncertainty costs businesses in innovative abilities.
Even former Commissioner Wright argues that application of the
unfairness test necessarily calls for an economic analysis.272 Such an
economic analysis should be flexible, and it should incorporate
harms to consumers on the one hand and benefits to consumers and
competition on the other.273 Alden Abbott also argues for an econ-
omic analysis here, placing the focus on “marginal benefits” and
“marginal costs.”274
This concept is not so new that it would be shocking for the FTC.
It simply forces the FTC to take much more careful consideration of
the harms of bringing a data security action. This approach will
make the most difference in cases like LabMD and TRENDnet, in
271. See id.
272. See Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Economics of Digital
Consumer Protection: One Commissioner’s View, Remarks at TechFreedom and International
Center for Law and Economics (July 31, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/573061/010731techfreedom.pdf [https://perma.cc/S544-SZ9C].
273. See id.
274. Alden Abbott states,
Economic logic indicates that the optimal business policy is not one that
focuses solely on implementing the strongest data protection system program
without regard to cost. Rather, the optimal policy is to invest in enhancing
corporate data security up to the point where the marginal benefits of additional
security equal the marginal costs, and no further.
Abbott, supra note 74, at 2.
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which it appears that the companies took steps to remedy the harms
as soon as they were made aware of them, and in which the alleged
violations were minimal.275
CONCLUSION
The FTC has overcorrected and overstepped its section 5 unfair-
ness power in data security cases, and it has overcorrected in its
efforts to crack down on poor data security practices. In proposing
a new framework for cost-benefit analysis, this Note does not argue
that there are no data security issues that need to be addressed or
that the FTC should stop regulating data security at all. In fact, the
FTC should continue to use this power in cases of clear misconduct
and egregious acts and practices.276 But the FTC’s enforcement
measures go too far. The FTC must begin to limit its reach to only
those cases involving serious or obvious misconduct because the
burden placed upon smaller or independently owned businesses in
cases involving minor violations or only a mere possibility of harm
to consumers is far too great. A framework similar to the antitrust
rule of reason will help the FTC to filter out these weaker cases, or
may even incentivize the FTC to come up with an alternative, less
harmful way to handle such cases, such as by creating a system
whereby smaller businesses with smaller violations are given a
warning with a certain period of time to correct the problem. There
are options for enforcement beyond just consent decrees and major
investigations.
Applying rule of reason analysis to the balancing portion of the
unfairness test will create more stability and predictability. Because
weaker cases will be filtered out, the FTC will, in theory, not bring
data security cases against businesses that were unaware of a
breach in their security because the breach was so minor, or against
businesses who were aware a breach occurred but took proper steps
to correct it. Those committing serious violations or who were aware
275. See Complaint, TRENDnet, Inc., supra note 220, at 5; Complaint, LabMD, Inc., supra
note 25, at 4-5.
276. Alden Abbott also made this argument, citing as support the FTC actions against
Credit Karma and Fandango, in which both companies knew about data security problems
with their phone applications, but decided to release the applications anyway. See Abbott,
supra note 74, at 6-7. 
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of a breach but did not do enough to correct it should foresee that
they will likely be subject to an FTC investigation. This is a fair way
to apply the unfairness test. 
Overall, applying rule of reason analysis in these data security
cases will benefit both the market and consumers by enabling small-
er businesses to continue to successfully compete in the market.
They will not be excused from clear cases of misconduct, but those
businesses working to protect consumers and correct any errors in
data security should not be punished so severely, if at all.
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